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of the 1974 Ohio Speedy Trial Act:
The First Five Years
The right to a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution is guaranteed by
the sixth amendment' and made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the
guarantee of a speedy trial protects "at least three basic demands of
criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system: '[l] to prevent undue
and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, [2] to minimize anxiety and
concern accompanying public accusation, and [3] to limit the possibilities
that long delay will impair the ability of the accused to defend himself.' 3
The right to a speedy trial is unique in a number of respects. 4 Unlike other
constitutional rights, its denial may actually benefit the accused since in
certain instances delay may work to his advantage. For instance, the
passage of time and the concomitant memory failure of individual
witnesses may make it more difficult for the state to meet its burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Another unique characteristic of
the constitutional right to a speedy trial is that "there is a societal interest in
providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in
opposition to, the interest of the accused." 5 In addition, the concept of
speedy trial is imprecise because the term "speedy" is ambiguous.
In Barker v. Wingo, 6 the United States Supreme Court listed four
factors that courts should consider to determine whether an accused has
been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. First, the court should
consider the length of delay. This factor acts as a triggering device. If the
delay appears long under the circumstances, then the court will apply the
other three factors to determine if an accused was denied a speedy trial.
Second, the court will look at the reason for the delay. Third, the court will
inquire whether the accused asserted his right to a speedy trial. Fourth, the
court will determine whether the delay prejudiced the accused. The Court
realized that this four-pronged test would present difficulties in
application, but was unwilling to require as a matter of constitutional law
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shallenjoy the right to a speedy ... trial ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
3. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374,377-78 (1969) (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116,120
(1966)).
4. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
5. Id. at 519.
6. Id. at 530.
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that an accused must be brotight to trial within a specific time limit.7 The
Court, however, noted that the individual states could prescribe specified
time periods in order to make this imprecise right more precise if they
chose. 8
Each of the states provides for the right to a speedy trial in its own
constitution, its statutes or rules of criminal procedure, or a combination
of these.9 In Ohio, a criminal defendant has both a constitutional right to
"a speedy public trial 10 and a statutory right to be brought to trial within a
specified number of days after arrest or service of summons."
This Comment will review court decisions interpreting the various
7. "We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified Into a
specific number of days or months. The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period
consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less precise." Id. at 523.
8. Id.
9. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967). "[E]ach of the 50 States guarantces the
right to a speedy trial to its citizens." See Comment, The Convict's Right to a Speedy TRlal, 61 J. CRIMi,
L.C. & P.S. 352, 356 (1970).
10. OHIo CorsT. art. I, § 10. The Ohio constitutional guarantee is coterminous with the federal,
State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969).
11. From 1869 to 1973, Ohio's speedy trial statute had measured permissible pretrial time
periods in "terms of court." E.g., 113 Ohio Laws 193, § 13447-1 (1929) (current version at O111O REV,
CODE ANN. §§ 2945.71-.73 (Page 1975 & Supp. 1978)). "A term of court [is] the space of time during
which a court holds a session." 14 OHIO JUR. 2d Courts § 75 (1955).
In 1973 the Ohio General Assembly repealed that statute and adopted the present law; the full text
is as follows:
§ 2945.71 Time within which hearing or trial must be held.
(A) A person against whom a charge is pending in a court not of record, or against
whom a charge of minor misdemeanor is pending in a court of record, shall be brought to
trial within thirty days after his arrest or the service of summons.
(B) A person against whom a charge of misdemeanor, other than a minor misde-
meanor, is pending in a court of record, shall be brought to trial:
(1) Within forty-five days after his arrest or the service of summons, if the offense
charged is a misdemeanor of the third or fourth degree, or other misdemeanor for which the
maximum penalty is imprisonment for not more than sixty days;
(2) Within ninety days after his arrest or the service of summons, if the offense charged
is a misdemeanor of the first or second degree, or other misdemeanor for which the maximum
penalty is imprisonment for more than sixty days.
(C) A person against whom a charge of felony is pending:
(1) Shall be accorded a preliminary hearing within fifteen days after his arrest;
(2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after his arrest.
(D) For purposes of computing time under divisions (A), (B), and (C) of this section,
each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be
counted as three days.
(E) This section shall not be construed to modify in any way section 2941.401
[2941.40.1], or sections 2963.30 to 2963.35 of the Revised Code.§ 2945.72 Extension of time for hearing or trial.
The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the case of felony, to
preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only by the following:
(A) Any period during which the accused is unavailable for hearing or trial, by reason
of other criminal proceedings against him, within or outside the state, by reason of his con-
finement in another state, or by reason of the pendency of extradition proceedings, provided
that the prosecution exercises reasonable diligence to secure his availability;
(B) Any period during which the accused is mentally incompetent to stand trial or
during which his mental competence to stand trial is being determined, or any period during
which the accused is physically incapable of standing trial;
(C) Any period of delay necessitated by the accused's lack of counsel, provided that
such delay is not occasioned by any lack of diligence in providing counsel to an indigent
accused upon his request as required by law;(D) Any period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the accused;
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provisions of the Ohio speedy trial statutes." First, this Comment will
discuss cases concerning how time is computed under these statutes. It will
next discuss the judicial interpretations concerning the granting of the
continuances expressly contemplated within the speedy trial statutes.' 3 It
will then discuss the result when an accused is not brought to trial or
preliminary hearing within the statutorily prescribed time period.
Throughout this Comment the writer argues that the decisions construing
the Ohio statutes are in effect abrogating an accused's statutory right to a
speedy trial. The Ohio courts, it will be shown, are ignoring or finding
inapplicable the precise statutory speedy trial time limits and are instead
applying a vague constitutional standard to determine if an accused has
been provided a speedy trial.
I. FACTORS COMPLICATING THE COMPUTATION OF TIME
A. Effect When Accused Is Arrested on One Charge and
the Charge Is Later Changed
Ohio Revised Code section 2945.7114 states that the running of the
time period within which one accused of a misdemeanor must be brought
(E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement, motion,
proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused;
(F) Any period of delay necessitated by a removal or change of venue pursuant to law;
(G) Any period during which trial is stayed pursuant to an express statutory require-
ment, or pursuant to an order of another court competent to issue such order,
(H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused's own motion, and the period
of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused's own motion;(I) Any period during which an appeal filed pursuant to section 2945.67 of the Revised
Code is pending.
§ 2945.73 Discharge for delay in trial.
(A) A charge of felony shall be dismissed if the accused is not accorded a preliminary
hearing within the time required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code.
(B) Upon motion made at our prior to the commencement of trial, a person charged
with an offense shall be discharged if he is not brought to trial within the time required by
sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code.
(C) Regardless of whether a longer time limit may be provided by sections 2945.71 and
2945.72 of the Revised Code, a person charged with misdemeanor shall be discharged ifheis
held in jail in lieu of bond awaiting trial on the pending charge:
(I) For a total period equal to the maximum term of imprisonment which may be
imposed for the most serious misdemeanor charged;
(2) For a total period equal to the term of imprisonment allowed in lieu of payment of
the maximum fine which may be imposed for the most serious misdemeanor charged, when
the offense or offenses charged constitute minor misdemeanors.
(D) When a charge of felony is dismissed pursuant to division (A) of this section, such
dismismissal [dismissal] has the same effect as a nolle prosequi. When an accused is dis-
charged pusruant to division (B) or (C) of this section, such discharge is a bar to any further
criminal proceedings against him based on the same conduct.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. 2945.71-.73 (Page 1975 & Supp. 1978) (effective January 1, 1974). The Ohio
Supreme Court has ruled that these statutes are not to be applied retroactively.The computation of the
limits listed in these statutes is from January 1, 1974, for actions then pending, rather than from the
actual earlier date of arrest. State v. McDonald, 48 Ohio St. 2d 66, 357 N.E.2d 40 (1976).
12. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Ohio Follows the Trend, 43 U. CIN. L REy. 610
(1974), for an excellent and detailed discussion of the history of the right to speedy trial, an evaluation
of the then newly enacted Ohio speedy trial statutes, and a comparison of these provisions with those of
other states.
13. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.72(H) (Page Supp. 1978) quoted at note 11 rlpra.
14. The text of the statute appears at note II supra.
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to trial is triggered by arrest of or service of summons on the accused. For
felonies, the running of the time period is triggered by the accused's
arrest.'5 Section 2945.71 sets time limits following arrest or service within
which an accused must be given a hearing or be brought to trial, 6 Unlike
the speedy trial provisions of some states, 7 Ohio's sets forth different time
periods within which an accused must be brought to trial depending upon
the nature of the charge pending. A person charged with a minor
misdemeanor' 8 must be brought to trial within fifteen days; a person
charged with a third or fourth degree misdemeanor must be brought to
trial within forty-five days; a person charged with a misdemeanor of the
first or second degree 20 must be brought to trial within ninety days. A
person charged with a felony must be accorded a preliminary hearing
within fifteen days of arrest and must be tried with 270 days after his arrest.
Because the speedy trial time limits vary depending upon the nature of
the offense charged, a problem arises when an accused is arrested on one
charge and the charge is later changed. For instance, an accused may be
15. One commentator has argued that the time period should be triggered by the filing of charges
if the filing occurs prior to arrest. See Note, supra note 12. See also Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 980 (1962) for
a general discussion of the extent to which delay between filing of charges and arrest of the accused
should constitute a violation of the right to a speedy trial. In State v. Cornell, 44 Ohio Misc. 29, 335
N.E.2d 891 (1975), the court held that a 35 month delay between the filing of an indictment and the
arrest of accused who lived and worked in the area, was listed in the telephone book, and was available
throughout the period of delay, was a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
16. The Ohio speedy trial statutes do not contain a provision concerning whether the time limits
are applicable in cases of mistrial, retrial, or trial de novo. Some states explicitly provide that their
statutes apply in these instances. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 22-3402(d) (4) (Supp. 1978) ("In the event a
mistrial is declared or a conviction is reversed on appeal to the supreme court or court of appeals, tile
time limitations provided herein shall commence to run from the date the mistrial is declared or the
date the mandate of the supreme court or court of appeals is filed in the district court.").
The Ohio Supreme Court has never decided whether the speedy trial statutes are applicable In
these cases. The Court did, however, overrule a motion to certify the record in State v. Gettys, 49 Ohio
App. 2d 241,360 N.E.2d 735 (1976), a case in which an appellate court had ruled that the Ohio speedy
trial statutes had no application in retrial. But cf. State v. Mackert, No. 77AP-922 (Franklin County
Ct. App. May 23, 1978), holding that the speedy trial period begins anew upon reversal and issuance of
a mandate by the supreme court to the lower court. See also State v. McAllister, 53 Ohio App. 2d 176,
372 N.E.2d 1341 (1977), holding that the statutory time limits did not apply when the accused vacated
his no contest plea. But see State v. Johnson, 52 Ohio App. 2d 406,370 N.E.2d 785 (1977), holding that
a rescheduling of a case for retrial after a jury had been unable to reach a verdict is a reasonable
continuance under section 2945.72(H). In Westerville v. Williams, 48 Ohio St. 2d 243,358 N.E.2d 540
(1975), the court held that when a criminal defendant is convicted in mayor's court and demands a trial
de novo in municipal court, the statutory speedy trial time provisions apply from the time the record is
certified from mayor's court to the municipal court and the appeal is docketed.
The Ohio courts have held that the Ohio speedy trial statutes do not apply in juvenile proceedings,
State v. Reed, 54 Ohio App. 2d 193,376 N.E.2d 609 (1977) (motion for leave to appeal overruled by the
Ohio Supreme Court on January 18, 1978); State v. Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d 189, 368 N.E,2d 1278
(1977). If, however, the state files a motion to transfer a proceeding from juvenile court to a court of
common pleas, the statutory time limits have been held to run after the juvenile court relinquishes
jurisdiction and transfers the accused to the common pleas court. State v. Young, 44 Ohio App, 2d 387,
339 N.E.2d 668 (1975).
17. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,§ 103-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978): KAN. STAT. §22-3402(Supp,
1978).
18. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.21 (Page 1975) defines the various types of misdemeanors in
Ohio.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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arrested on a felony charge that is later reduced to a first degree
misdemeanor charge. This means that the accused must be brought to trial
within ninety days instead of 270. What happens if one hundred days have
already passed before the reduction was made? Should the accused be
discharged because he was not brought to trial within ninety days of arrest?
Or do the hundred days of pretrial confinement not count because they
were imposed under a different charge? In other words, does the ninety-day
time limit for the misdemeanor charge start to run only after the
misdemeanor charge is pending against the accused?
In State v. Walker,2' the defendant was arrested on January 15, 1974,
for allegedly beating a baby. The baby subsequently died on January 17,
1974. On January 22, 1974, the charge was escalated to manslaughter. The
Jefferson County Court of Appeals held that the speedy trial time period
began to run on January 22, 1974. The court based its decision on the fact
that defendant was convicted on the manslaughter charge and not on the
charge for which he was originally arrested. It determined that the speedy
trial time begins to run only after the defendant is charged with the specific
offense for which he is subsequently brought to trial.
The Summit County Court of Appeals in State v. Sauers held that
"the date from which the speedy trial provisions of R.C. 2945.71 begin to
run for an accused whose original felony charge has been reduced to a
misdemeanor is the date the summons was served for the lesser offense. 22
The defendant had been arrested on a charge of aggravated burglary, a first
degree felony. The grand jury, however, returned an indictment for
criminal trespass, a fourth degree misdemeanor. Therefore, instead of
having 270 days to bring defendant to trial as it would under a felony
charge, the state had only forty-five days in which to bring defendant to
trial for the misdemeanor charge. Ninety-nine statutory days23 had elapsed
between defendant's arrest on the felony charge and the service of process
on him of the misdemeanor charge. The court reasoned that "the
defendant's felony charge . . . was dismissed by the grand jury and anew
charge followed. This new charge brought into action the statutory time
limitations relating to misdemeanors. The time limitations of the statute
relating to felonies were no longer applicable., 24
The Sauers court thus interpreted the statute to say that each time an
accused's charge is changed the statutory time period begins anew. The
court gave no justification for this interpretation other than that the statute
speaks of "a pending charge" in calculating the applicable time period. The
21. 42 Ohio App. 2d 41, 327 N.E.2d 796 (1974).
22. 52 Ohio App. 2d 113,113,368 N.E.2d 334,335 (1977), aft'g52 Ohio Misc. 19,368 N.E.2d 342
(1977).
23. The defendant had spent 30 days in jail on the pending felony charge. Since § 2945.71(D)
provides that each day defendant is held in jail in lieu of bond is to be counted as three days; the30 days
in jail count as 90 days. Defendant had also spent nine days out on bond before the chargeagainst him
was reduced. Thus, he had a total of 99 statutory days worth of "credit."
24. 52 Ohio App. 2d 113, 114, 368 N.E.2d 334, 335 (1977).
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court completely ignored the purposes behind the speedy trial right: to
prevent undue pretrial delays; to minimize anxiety accompanying public
accusation; and to limit the possibility that delay will limit the accused's
ability to defend himself.25 If the defendant had been correctly charged
initially, tried within the statutory period specified for that charge,
convicted, and sentenced to the maximum penalty possible, he probably
would have served his time and been released within ninety days.
26
Moreover, the holding in Sauers provides a strong motive for prosecutors
to overcharge initially since the time spent on the charge will not count
under the speedy trial statutes if the charge is later reduced.
A better holding in both Walker and Sauers would have been that, for
speedy trial purposes, the initial arrest or service of summons resulting
from an illegal act triggers the running of the statutory time period and that
a subsequent change of the charge does not cause the time period to begin
anew. The first charge should set the time running; the charge for which the
accused is ultimately brought to trial should determine the length of the
period.27 To hold otherwise encourages initial overcharging or subsequent
charge changing by the prosecution to defeat the speedy trial time limits,28
25. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
26. The maximum jail sentence possible for violation of a fourth degree misdemeanor is thirty
days in jail. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.21(B)(4)(Page 1975). A person accused of a fourth degree
misdemeanor must be brought to trial within 45 days of arrest or service of summons. Therefore, if the
accused had been tried on the 45th day and immediately sentenced to serve 30 days, only 75 days would
have elapsed.
Actually, it is -arguable that the court erred in not dismissing defendant in this case pursuant to
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.73(C)(l)(Page 1975), which states:
Regardless ofwhether a longer limit may be provided by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 . . . a
person charged with misdemeanor shall be discharged if he is held in jail in lieu of bond
awaiting trial on the pending charge . . . [flor a total period equal to the maximum term of
imprisonment which may be imposed for the most serious misdemeanor charged;
In Sauers, defendant had been held in jail for 30 days after his arrest (October 22 to November 21) on
the felony charge. Regardless of the fact that the felony charge was reduced to a misdemeanor,
defendant had already spent 30 days (the maximum possible sentence) in jail as a consequence of his
illegal conduct.
27. Assume an accused is arrested on a felony charge and incarcerated. As a result of plea
negotiations the accused pleads no contest to a misdemeanor. Assume further that the accused has
already been incarcerated beyond the period allowed by the speedy trial statutes for someone charged
with this misdemeanor. If the time the accused spent in jail on the felony is credited to the accused in
computing the speedy trial period, the accused would be entitled to discharge and dismissal of the
charge with no resulting conviction. Such a result would have the unfortunate effect ofcircumscribing
the range of possible plea negotiations. It is possible to avoid this result, however, by making it a part of
the plea bargaining agreement that the accused has waived his statutory right to a speedy trial.
-Although the time already served would thus have no significance for computation of the speedy
trial period, it should be credited to reduce any jail sentence received upon conviction, One Ohio
appellate court has held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that
persons held in jail on a felony charge receive full credit for the period of their pretrial incarceration
through deduction of that period from the maximum sentence imposed e-ven when conviction is for a
lesser included misdemeanor offense. Haddox v. Houser, 44 Ohio App. 2d 389,339 N.E.2d 666 (1975),
28. Dayton v. Peterson, 56 Ohio Misc. 12, 381 N.E.2d 1154 (1978), concerned the reverse
situation. In Peterson, defendant had been charged with a minor misdemeanor. Section 2945,71(A)
requires that a person charged with a minor misdemeanor be brought to trial within 30 days of arrest or
service of summons. Defendant was not tried until 45 days after his arrest. At trial the state proved the
elements necessary to convict defendant of a fourth degree misdemeanor. A person charged with a
fourth degree misdemeanor has to be brought to trial within 45 days. The prosecution argued that since
defendant was actually guilty of the fourth degree misdemeanor, the 45 day limit should apply and that
[Vol. 40: 363
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B. Effect When Original Charges Are Dismissed Without
Prejudice and the Accused Is Subsequently Charged
With the Same Offense
In situations in which the original charge against an accused is
dismissed without prejudice and the accused is subsequently charged again
for the same offense, the majority ofjurisdictions29 take the approach that,
because the recharging is a new proceeding, the statutory speedy trial time
limitations apply only from the date of the recharge. There are two
minority approaches. 30 Both are based on the premise that the state should
not be able to circumvent the effect of a speedy trial statute by filing a nolle
prosequi or by allowing the case to be dismissed for want of prosecution.
One minority approach is that recommended by the American Bar
Association (ABA) in its Standards Relating to Speedy Trial.31 The ABA
approach requires that the time between the service of the original
summons and its dismissal~be counted for purposes of speedy trial. The
ABA approach does not count the time between the date of the dismissal
and the date of the second service of summons. The ABA reasons that this
latter period should not be counted since the accused has no charge
pending against him during this period. The other minority view, here
designated the strict approach, holds that the computation of the time
within which accused must be brought to trial is measured from the time of
arrest or service of summons on the original charge. Dismissing the charge
does not toll the running of the statutory period under this approach.
32
The Ohio Supreme Court recently addressed the recharging issue for
the first time 33 in Westlake v. Cougill.3 4 Defendant had received a sum-
mons on January 15, 1976. The case was dismissed without prejudice on
February 19, 1976. On March 2, 1976, defendant received a second
summons charging the same offense. The court took the approach
recommended by the ABA and held that the time from the service of the
original summons to its dismissal would be counted for purposes of speedy
trial. The court held that the time between the date of dismissal and the
defendant, therefore, was provided a speedy trial. The court felt, however, that it would be unfair to
change the complaint charging a minor misdemeanor to one charging a fourth degree misdemeanor
after trial Defendant was discharged for failure to be brought to trial within the statutoy time limit for
minor misdemeanors.
29. See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 462 (1953), discussed in State v. Stephens, 52 Ohio App. 2d 361,
370-71, 370 N.E.2d 759,766 (1977). See also State v. Avriett, 25 Ariz. App. 63,540 P.2d 1282(1975),
and State v. Fink, 217 Kan. 671, 538 P.2d 1390 (1975), which support the majbrity approach.
30. See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 462 (1953).
31. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.3(f) & Comments (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited
as ABA STANDARDS].
32. SeeThigpenv. State, 350 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. App.), certdismssed,354So.2d986(Fla. 1978).
See also Recent Cases, 81 DICK. L. Ry. 387-94 (1977), discussing a recent decision ofthe Pennsylvania
Supreme Court that adopts the strict approach.
33. The issue had previously been addressed in two appellate court cases. State v. Stephens, 52
Ohio App. 2d 361, 370 N.E.2d 759 (1977); State v. Justice, 49 Ohio App. 2d 46,358 N.E.2d 1382 (1976).
34. 56 Ohio St. 2d 230, 383 N.E.2d 599 (1978).
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date of the second service of summons would not count since, it reasoned,
defendant had no charge pending against him during this period.
While the middle ground taken by the Ohio Supreme Court is
preferable to the majority approach, the court should have adopted the
strict approach. It comports more closely with the concept of the right to a
speedy trial. The purpose of the speedy trial statutes is to make precise the
imprecise constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. These statutes should
be strictly construed by the court to secure the end sought by the
legislature.35 "[T]o permit the state to deprive an accused of the right to
discharge by the simple expedient of nol-prossing the original indictment
and procuring a new indictment for the same offense is, in effect, to rewrite
the statute ... ,36 The strict approach acknowledges what is actually
the case: although the dismissal formally removes the charges, the charges
are actually "pending" against the accused since the state is using the time
between the dismissal and the second charging to develop its case against
the accused.
C. Effect of Delays on Computing the Speedy Trial Time
Ohio Revised Code section 2945.72 lists in separate subsections (A)
through (I) nine factors that extend the period of time during which an
accused must be brought to trial. Four of these factors provide for the
extension of the statutory period for "any period of delay" occasioned or
necessitated by certain enumerated actions generally within the control of
the accused,37 such as improper acts or filing of defense motions. Four
other factors extend the statutory period to include the "period during
which" '38 certain circumstances generally not within the control of the
accused are present. Examples include the period during which an accused
is mentally incompetent to stand trial or during which his competence is
being evaluated. The statutory period may also be extended, under section
2945.72(H), by continuances. This factor fits into neither of the two
preceding categories.
Because Ohio maintains no formal records of legislative history, it is
not known whether the Ohio General Assembly intended this distinction in
terms to have any effect in determining the period to be excluded. The
ABA Standards provide no assistance on this point because they use the
term "period of delay" to describe all excluded periods regardless of the
role of the accused in bringing about the excluded period.39 '
35. State v. Silver, 57 Ohio St. 2d 1,384 N.E.2d 710 (1979); State v. Wentworth, 54 Ohio St, 2d
171,375 N.E.2d424 (1978); State v. Tope, 53 Ohio St. 2d 250,374 N.E.2d 152 (1978); State v. Singer, 50
Ohio St. 2d 103,362 N.E.2d 1216 (1977); State v. MacDonald,48 Ohio St. 2d 66,357 N.E.2d 40 (1976);
State v. Pudlock, 44 Ohio St. 2d 104, 338 N.E.2d 524 (1975).
36. Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 462, 465 (1953).
37. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.72(C)-.72(F), quoted at note II supra.
38. See id. § 2945.72(A), .72(B), .72(G), .72(1), quoted at note II supra.
39. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 31, § 2.3(a)-.3(h).
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The Supreme Court of Ohio has never construed this distinction in the
language of section 2945.72, but a related issue came before the Belmont
County Court of Appeals in State v. Lacy.40 In that case the defendant was
arrested on a felony charge on October 9, 1974, and incarcerated until trial
because he was unable to post bond. On December 3, 1974, the trial court
set the trial date for January 9, 1975. Thus, the trial date was set for ninety-
two days after arrest-two days beyond statutory maximum. On
December 18, 1974, the defendant filed a motion for change of venue,
which was overruled on January 6, 1975, and the defendant was brought to
trial on January 9, 1975, as previously assigned. The issue, therefore, was
whether the pendency of the motion constituted a "period of delay"
occasioned by the accused. The majority in Lacy held that during the
nineteen-day period the accused's motion was pending the court's "right to
change defendant's trial date to comply with R. C. 2945.71 was
suspended .. .. "4' For this reason the nineteen days constituted a
"period of delay necessitated by reason of a . . . motion . . . instituted
by the accused ' 42 under subsection 2945.72(E). Therefore, the court held
that the time within which the accused had to be brought to trial was
extended nineteen days and thus the January 9 trial date was within the
statutory period. In a vigorous dissent, Judge Joseph O'Neill argued that
no delay had been necessitated as a result of the accused's motion. He
argued that because the motion had not delayed the case from going to trial
on the date already assigned, there was no reason to attribute a nineteen-
day delay to the accused. He would have discharged the accused for failure
of the state to bring him to trial within the statutorily prescribed period of
ninety days.43
Although the Ohio Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue
presented in Lacy,44 other jurisdictions have generally held that the entire
period of the pendency of an accused's motion is a delay that is to be
excepted from the time in which an accused must be brought to trial.45 An
alternative approach is contained in the federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974.46
40. 46 Ohio App. 2d 215, 348 N.E.2d 381 (1975).
41. Id. at 216, 348 N.E.2d at 383.
42. OHio REV. CODE ANx. § 2945.72(E) (Page Supp. 1978).
43. Judge O'Neill went on to say that while no one wanted to see a guilty person go free because
of errors in procedural calculations, the right to a speedy trial is an important constitutional right and
the provisions of §§ 2945.71-.73 must be strictly complied with since they are the legislature's enactment
of the constitutional right. State v. Lacy, 46 Ohio App. 2d 215, 219, 348 N.E.2d 381. 384 (1975).
44. See generally State v. Ladd, 56 Ohio St. 2d 197, 383 N.E.2d 579 (1978). construing §
2945.72(C) (defendant received no credit for seven-day period of delay necessitated by request for time
to acquire services of attorney); State v. Walker, 46 Ohio St. 2d 157.346 N.E.2d 687 (1976) (held."[t]he
time elapsing between the tendering of a plea of'not guilty by reason of insanity' and a finding of mental
competency to stand trial directly resulting from such plea shall not be included in computing days
under 2945.72").
45. See, e.g., Rudstein, Speedy Trial in Illinois: The Statutory Right. 25 DEPA.L L. RE%. 317.
322-52 (1976) (discussing the Illinois speedy trial statute): Note. Speedy" Trial Protection for Criminal
Defendants Under Indiana's Criminal Rule 4,8 VAL. L. REv. 683.692-93 (1974) (discussing the Indiana
rule of criminal procedure concerning speedy trial).
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1976).
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The federal Act does not exclude the entire pendency of the motion from
counting in speedy trial time calculation, but specifically provides that only
delay resulting from the actual hearings on the pretrial motions is to be
excluded 4 7
The approach adopted in the federal Act is preferable because it
encourages expeditious handling of criminal cases. Defense counsel ought
to be able to estimate accurately how long hearings on motions will take
and make a reasoned determination whether a motion would be worth the
extension that would result under the federal Act. By contrast, treating the
entire period that a motion is pending as an excludable delay enables the
trial court to "sit on" a case by taking a long time to rule on the motion. An
accused might well be discouraged from filing legitimate motions because
he could not predict the degree to which such motions might extend the
time within which he must be brought to trial.
D. Effect of the Triple-Count Provision on Computing Time
When Accused Is Incarcerated on Multiple Charges
Section 2945.71(D) defines what is commonly called "triple-count
credit": "[E]ach day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bond
on the pending charge shall be counted as three days." For instance, an
accused charged with a felony must be brought to trial within 270 days of
arrest if out on bond, but within ninety days if held in jail while awaiting
trial. In many instances the application of triple-count credit presents no
problem,48 but when the accused is being held in jail on more than one
pending charge, it is unclear whether the accused is entitled to triple-count
credit on any or all of the pending charges.
Cases construing the former Ohio speedy trial statutes had held that
the accelerated trial provisions of those statutes were applicable only when
accused's detention resulted solely from the charge from which he was
seeking a discharge. 49 The former statutes did not contain a triple-count
provision. They did, however, provide that an incarcerated accused had to
be brought to trial within two terms of the court, but that the state had
three terms in which to begin to try an accused out on bond.50 These cases
held that an incarcerated accused received the benefit of the two-term
provision only if he had a single charge pending against him; the presence
of multiple charges abolished an accused's right to be brought to trial
within two terms on any of the charges.
In State v. MacDonald,51 the Ohio Supreme Court first addressed the
applicability of the triple-count provision to an accused with multiple
47. Id. § 3161(h)(E).
48. See, e.g., State v. Tope, 53 Ohio St. 2d 250, 374 N.E.2d 152 (1978).
49. State v. Fairbanks, 32 Ohio St. 2d 34,289 N.E.2d 352 (1972); State ex rel. Hodgcs v. Collcr,
19 Ohio St. 2d 164, 249 N.E.2d 885 (1969); State v. Gray, I Ohio St. 2d 21,203 N.E.2d 319 (1964).
50. See note I 1 supra.
51. 48 Ohio St. 2d 66, 357 N.E.2d 40 (1976).
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charges pending against him.52 Defendant was being detained on both
state and federal charges. The court held that defendant was not entitled to
the triple-count provision because he was not being held solely on the
pending state charge that was the object of the speedy trial statute. The
court's reasoning was:
The objective of former R.C. 2945.71 is substantially the same as that of
present R.C. 2945.71(D). Both seek to insure that defendants are not held injail for undue periods of time while awaiting trial. We see no justification for
altering prior case law since the basic objective of the former statute has been
preserved.53
The court has reaffirmed MacDonald in subsequent cases.54 Recently,
however, the court announced in State v. Iadd 55 that it would not blindly
adhere to MacDonald, but would instead scrutinize closely the charges
pending against the defendant to prevent "a prosecutor['s] . . . add[ing]
a frivolous charge to a meritorious one in order to invoke MacDonaldand
thus deny a defendant the benefit of R.C. 2945.71(D)."56
State v. Ladd is an important decision because it demonstrates the
danger that can result when the courts must deal with an issue on which the
statute is ambiguous. The majority in Ladd first admonished the
legislature for enacting ambiguous statutes, and then asserted that the
legislative "rationale supporting these statutory provisions was to prevent
inexcusable delays caused by indolence within the judicial system."'" The
court went on to say that "where the system is without fault, we will not
enforce these rigorous time limitations when a narrowing construction or a
finding of total inapplicability of the statute on the facts would better
comport with presumed legislative purpose."58
Justice William Brown argued in his dissenting opinion in Ladd that
the majority had presumed a nonexistent legislative purpose. He argued
that "[i]f the majority is attempting to introduce a fault standard into the
application of these statutes, it does so against the clear weight of
authority. The language of R.C. 2945.71 and its predecessor is and was
mandatory, and this court has consistently held those statutes must be
complied with. 59
The Ladd majority's insistence that it will not enforce the speedy trial
52. In two previous cases the courts ofappeals seem to have assumed that when a personwho has
been charged with a felony is detained in jail on a "hold" imposed by his parole officer, heisentitled to
triple-count credit. State v. Kelly, 44 Ohio App. 2d 40, 335 N.E.2d 729 (1974); State v. Walker, 42 Ohio
App. 2d 41, 327 N.E.2d 796 (1974). Judge O'Neill, concurring in Walker, disagreed.
53. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 70, 357 N.E.2d at 43.
54. State v. Martin, 56 Ohio St. 2d 207, 384 N.E.2d 239 (1978); State v. Ladd,56 Ohio Si 2d 197,
383 N.E.2d 579 (1978); State v. Kaiser, 56 Ohio St. 2d 29, 381 N.E.2d 633 (1978). See also State v.
Thieshen, 55 Ohio App. 2d 99, 379 N.E.2d 622 (1977).
55. 56 Ohio SL 2d 197, 383 N.E.2d 579 (1978).
56. Id. at 203 n.4, 383 N.E.2d at 583 nA.
57. Id. at 200, 383 N.E.2d at 581.
58. Id. at 202, 383 N.E.2d at 582-83
59. Id. at 204 n.5, 383 N.E.2d at 583 n.5.
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statutes except when the judicial system has been at fault in causing the
delay is indeed unprecedented. In a long line of previous cases the court
held that sections 2945.71 to 2945.73 are mandatory and must be strictly
complied with.60 Moreover, the court previously had held that the purpose
behind the enactment of the speedy trial statutes was "to insure that
defendants are not held in jail for undue periods of time while awaiting
trial., 61 It is clear that the legislature enacted specified time limits to insure
a speedy trial in all instances and not only when the judicial system was at
fault.
The Ladd court's position that an accused's "personal crime wave
cannot be allowed to put the state in a position of having to try him on each
count within 90 days"' 62 seems incorrect and unnecessary. Section
2945.71(A) provides for an extension of the speedy trial time limit for
"[a]ny period during which the accused is unavailable for hearing or trial,
by reason of other criminal proceedings against him, within or outside the
state . ..provided that the prosecution exercises reasonable diligence to
secure his availability. 63 At a minimum, this proviion would toll the
running of the speedy trial period on all other pending charges in the
jurisdiction while the accused was being tried on one of the charges. The
legislature might well have thought that extensions for the period of trial
on other pending charges would provide the state with enough time to try
the accused on all charges, yet allow the triple-count provision to be
applied.
In light of the Ohio Supreme Court's holdings in MacDonald and
Ladd, it would be useful for the Ohio legislature to amend the present
speedy trial statutes to explicitly cover the situation of an accused who has
multiple charges pending against him. The legislature could do this by
making it clear that such an accused is to receive the benefit of the triple-
count provision and that the state can use section 2945.72(A) to extend the
time. Alternatively, Ohio might follow an Illlinois speedy trial provision
64
that a person incarcerated in a county in which more than one charge is
pending against him is to be tried on one charge within the accelerated
statutory period. He must then be tried on all other charges within 160 days
of the termination of the first trial.
II. GRANTING CONTINUANCES UNDER THE
SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTES
Section 2945.72(H) provides for an extension of the speedy trial time
limitations for the period of any continuance granted on the accused's own
60. E.g., State v. Wentworth, 54 Ohio St. 2d 171,375 N.E.2d 424 (1978); State v. Singer, 50 Ohio
St. 2d 103, 362 N.E.2d 1216 (1977); State v. Pudlock, 44 Ohio St. 2d 104, 338 N.E.2d 524 (1975),
61. State v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St. 2d 66, 70, 357 N.E.2d 40, 43 (1976).
62. 56 Ohio St. 2d at 203, 383 N.E2d at 583.
63. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.72(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
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motion or for the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than
, • 65
upon the accused's own motion. This amorphous provision permits
enormous judicial discretion over the effectiveness of the speedy trial
statute.
In State v. Johnson,66 the Franklin County Court of Appeals held that
the rescheduling of a case for a second trial after ajury was unable to reach
a verdict in the first trial was a reasonable continuance granted other than
upon the accused's own motion under section 2945.72(H). In dicta in a
concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Dayton
Newspapers v. Phillips,67 two justices debated whether a continuance
could be granted pursuant to section 2945.72(H) to permit publicity to
abate.6
Most of the reported cases that deal with section 2945.72(H),
however, concern one of two issues. One issue is whether a court may use
this provision to grant a continuance because of court congestion. The
second issue concerns whether the trial date may initially beset outside the
time limit prescribed by this subsection if the accused's attorney agrees to
the delayed date.
A. Whether Section 2945.72(H) Permits Continuances for
Court Congestion
Realizing the deleterious effect of an expansive interpretation of
section 2945.72(H) on the right to a speedy trial, the Ohio Supreme Court
asserted in State v. Pudlock69 that practices that would undermine the
effectiveness of the speedy trial statutes would not be allowed. Specifically,
the court held that a trial judge could not rule sua sponte after the
expiration of the statutory period that the presence of a crowded docket
permitted a continuance granted other than upon the accused's own
motion.
Subsequently, in State v. Lee,70 the court interpreted section
2945.72(H) to permit continuances for crowded dockets if the trial judge
stated his reasons in ajournal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit.
The court recognized that "to construe R.C. 2945.72[(H)] too broadly
would render meaningless, and thwart the direction of, the speedy-trial
statutes," 71 yet found the disputed continuance permissible. In Lee, the
trial judge notified the defendant, who did not object, that he was
extending the trial two days beyond the time limit. The reasons cited by the
65. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.72(H) (Page Supp. 1978), quoted at note I I supra.
66. 52 Ohio App. 2d 406, 370 N.E.2d 785 (1977).
67. 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 469, 351 N.E.2d 127, 135 (1976) (Stern,J., concurring); Id. at523 n.59,
351 N.E.2d at 165-66 n.59 (1976) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
68. That continuance might be used as a remedy for pretrial publicity was suggested by the
United States Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
69. 44 Ohio St. 2d 104, 338 N.E.2d 524 (1976).
70. 48 Ohio St. 2d 208, 357 N.E.2d 1095 (1976).
71. Id. at 209, 357 N.E.2d at 1096.
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judge in a journal entry were a crowded docket and a judicial conference.
The Ohio Supreme Court noted that the legislature left section 2945.72(H)
purposely ambiguous to provide the courts flexibility to determine if in
some instances extensions were merited for reasons other than those
specifically enumerated in sections 2945.72(A) through 2945.72(G).72 The
court thought that the reasons stated in the journal entry merited a two-
day continuance.
In State v. Wentworth,73 accused was arrested on September 20, 1975,
and charged with a misdemeanor that required him to be brought to trial
within ninety days of arrest. Accused refused to waive his statutory right to
a speedy trial at his pretrial hearing on October 14, 1975. "At the
conclusion of the pre-trial, the court, utilizing a form entry wherein it was
stated, 'The crowded condition of the courts [sic] docket does not permit
an earlier setting,' and without additional supplementation or documenta-
tion in the record, continued the case, pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H), until
April 12, 1976," 74 a continuance of approximately six months.
In Wentworth, the Ohio Supreme Court found the six-month
continuance to be unreasonable and discharged the defendant. The court,
nevertheless, refused to declare a six-month continuance per se
unreasonable. Instead, the court stated that
where the continuance is of such length that it is facially unreasonable and
seriously open to question, and thus outside the rationale upon which Lee is
based, the attendant facts and circumstances must be included in the record in
sufficient detail so that the necessity and reasonableness of the continuance is
demonstrable.75
The vagueness of this instruction limits its value to a trial judge. The court
provides no guidelines for determining what length of time is facially
unreasonable. Furthermore, the court does not give examples of any facts
or circumstances that would demonstrate the necessity and reasonableness
of the continuance. In Lee, a two-day continuance in a felony case was
reasonable when the journal entry cited both a crowded docket and a
judicial conference. In Wentworth, a six-month continuance in a
misdemeanor case was unreasonable and seriously open to question even
though thejournal entry cited the crowded condition of the court docket as76
the reason for the continuance. Moreover, the purpose behind the speedy
72. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.72(A)-.72(I) (Page Supp. 1978), quoted at note 11 supra.
73. 54 Ohio St. 2d 171, 375 N.E.2d 424 (1978).
74. Id. at 171-72, 375 N.E.2d at 425.
75. Id. at 175, 375 N.E.2d at 427.
76. See Elmwood Place v. Denike, 56 Ohio St. 2d 427, 384 N.E. 2d 707 (1978). Defendant was
arrested for a misdemeanor that required commencement of trial within 90 days. The court granted a
123-day continuance citing in the record a standardized form stating that the crowded condition of the
court docket prevented the trial from being held within the statutory period. The record also contained
a statement of the trial court made at the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss for want of a speedy
trial. At that time the judge stated, " 'We had some idea that there were going to be twenty-two
witnesses. That's to indicate to the Assignment Commission that we were going to have a lengthy trial
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trial statutes is to make precise the time period within which an accused
must be brought to trial. The court's use of a "reasonableness" test defeats
the goal of setting specified time limits.
In Wentworth, the court cited to, but expressly did not suggest
agreement with, the ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial. These
standards approve continuances because of crowded dockets only in cases
of exceptional circumstances and not merely because of chronic court
congestion. The ABA reasoned that:
(1) The defendant can be prejudiced by delay, whatever the source
... (2) Such delays are contrary to the public interest in the prompt
disposition of criminal cases. (3) If congestion excuses long delays,
there is lacking sufficient inducement for the state to remedy congestion. (4)
The calendar problems which arise out of trying to make maximum use of
existing facilities do not ordinarily require time beyond that otherwise
allowed."
The ABA Standards suggest large-scale riots or mass public disorder as
examples of exceptional circumstances that might justify a delay.
The ABA Standards have been the model for most of the recent state
speedy trial statutes. It is likely, therefore, that the Ohio legislature
intended to endorse this particular view but failed to do so explicitly. If the
Ohio Supreme Court wouldjudicially adopt this standard it would provide
state trial judges with firm guidelines by which to determine the propriety
of granting a continuance because of court congestion. Moreover,
adopting this strict standard would be consistent with the court's
acknowledgment of the need to construe 2945.72(H) narrowly.
B. The Spurious Relationship Between Section 2945.72(H)
and the Demand-Waiver Rule
The demand-waiver rule provides that if an accused fails to demand
that his trial be held within the statutorily prescribed period he waives his
statutory right to a speedy trial. Jurisdictions that reject the rule believe it
should be the state's burden to bring the accused to trial within the
statutory period, and reason that use of the rule would unfairly shift this
burden onto the accused.78
and it would be more difficult arriving at a suitable date.'" Id. at 430,384 N.E. 2d at 709. The Ohio
Supreme Court stated:
The above evidence of record is insufficient to demonstrate the necessity ofa continuance
for purposes of appellate review. The fact that a comparatively large number ofwitnesses was
expected to be called to testify at trial does not indicate such an exceptional circumstance as
to justify the postponement of the trial date approximately four months beyond the
prescribed time period. As noted in Lee, supra, at page 209,' . . . to construe R.C. 2945.72
too broadly would render meaningless, and thwart the direction of, the speedy-trial statutes.
Id. at 430-31, 384 N.E. 2d at 709.
77. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 31, § 2.3(b) & Commentary.
78. See Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302 (1958) (discussing demand-waiver rule and listingjurisdictions
that follow the rule). See also Rudstein, supra note 45, at 327-29, for a discussion of the relationship of
the demand-waiver rule to the Illinois speedy trial statute, and Note, supra note 45, at 707-09, for a
discussion of the relationship of the demand-waiver rule to the Indiana speedy trial rule.
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In State v. Singer,79 the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected application
of the demand-waiver rule, holding instead that an accused's statutory
right to a speedy trial is not affected by his failure to demand trial. The
court noted that the only duty imposed upon the accused to obtain the
benefit of the statutory right to a speedy trial is to make a motion for
discharge for want of a speedy trial either at orprior to the commencement
of trial.80
In State v. Tope s' the court reaffirmed its holding in Singer. The court
rejected the lower court's characterization of the accused's failure to object
to a trial scheduled outside the statutory period as a neglectful or improper
act that justified extension of the statutory time under section 2945.
72(D).8 2 The court also said the lower court erred in finding that
2945.72(H) extended the period, since no continuance had ever been
granted by the trial court.8
3
The scope of Singer and Tope, however, appears to have been greatly
restricted by the court's subsequent holding in State v. McRae.84 In McRae
defendant was arrested on February 6, 1976, for alleged commission of a
felony. He was incarcerated continuously thereafter. Defense counsel was
appointed on April 7, 1976. Two weeks after counsel was appointed, and
seventy-five days after defendant's arrest, a pretrial conference attended by
the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel was held. At this conference all
parties agreed to a trial date of June 7, 1976, a date thirty days beyond the
speedy trial deadline. There was some evidence that at the time of the
conference defense counsel was unaware that the trial date had been set
outside the statutory period. Ninety-seven days after defendant's arrest,
and seven days after the statutory period normally would have expired,
defense counsel filed a motion to discharge for want of a speedy trial. The
motion was denied. Counsel subsequently requested a continuance of the
trial date.
In McRae the court addressed the following issues:
(1) [W]hether the constitutional right to a speedy trial, as implemented in this
state by R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73, can be waived by the attorney of an
accused where the accused is not aware of or informed of the waiver and (2)
whether a court's scheduling of a trial date beyond the speedy trial deadline
constitutes a "continuance granted other than upon the accused's own
motion" pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H) when that trial date is one which the
accused's attorney specifically agrees to in a pre-trial conference in which thejudge and the attorney for both sides participate.85
79. 50 Ohio St. 2d 103, 106, 362 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (1977).
80. Id. at 107, 362 N.E.2d at 1219. See Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.73(B) (Page Supp. 1978),
quoted at note I 1 supra.
81. 53 Ohio St. 2d 250, 374 N.E.2d 152 (1978).
82. Id. at 252, 374 N.E.2d at 154. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.72(D) (Page Supp, 1978),
quoted at note 11 supra.
83. Id. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.72(H) (Page Supp. 1978), quoted at note 11 supra,
84. 55 Ohio St. 2d 149, 378 N.E.2d 476 (1978).
85. Id. at 150, 378 N.E.2d at 477-78.
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In resolution of its first issue, the court determined that defense
counsel could properly waive the accused's speedy trial right. The court
reasoned that since counsel later requested a continuance for reasons of
trial preparation, "it [stood] to reason that his agreement to the June 7 date
was also made with such considerations in mind.9 6
In resolving its second issue the court held that
the trial court has the discretion to extend the time limits of R.C. 2945.71
where counsel for the accused voluntarily agrees to a trial date set beyond the
statutory time limits . . . .Moreover, the trial court's exercise of that
discretion constitutes a" 'continuance granted other than upon the accused's
own motion' under the second clause of 2945.72(H)" . . . and, as long as
that continuance is reasonable, it extends the time limits of R.C. 2945.71 and
does not deny the accused the right to a speedy trial.87
The court framed its second issue and holding poorly. There was no
need to invoke section 2945.72(H) continuances to resolve the case. The
function of a section 2945.72(H) continuance is to extend the statutory
period. If an accused's statutory speedy trial right has been waived
altogether, there is no need to find a continuance. The court ought properly
to have considered only whether counsel's agreement to the initial setting
of the trial date beyond the statutory period had constituted waiver of
accused's statutory right.
It is apparent from the court's analysis and holding in McRae that it
has confused the distinct concepts of waiver and continuance. There would
be no reason for the court to have determined that defense counsel could
waive accused's statutory speedy trial right by assenting to a continuance if
it were not concerned with whether defense counsel actually did waive the
right. Because the court has confused these two concepts, McRae stands
for the proposition that an accused does not waive his right to a speedy trial
by failing to object to a trial date set beyond the statutory period. In this
respect it is merely affirming the court's previous decisions in Singer and
Tope. But McRae also stands for the proposition that agreeing to a trial
date set beyond the statutory period is a waiver of the statutory right. Thus,
the court can be seen to have adopted a modified demand-waiver rule: an
accused is not required to demand a trial within the statutory period or
waive the right; but if an accused is offered a trial date outside the statutory
period, he must object to that date and demand trial within the statutory
period, or he waives his right.
The court in McRae in effect shifted onto the accused the burden of
ensuring that he is brought to trial within the statutory period,
contradicting its own recent decisions placing that burden upon the state
and strictly construing the provisions of the speedy trial statutes.88 Because
86. Id. at 152, 378 N.E.2d at 478. The Ohio Supreme Court had previously held that defense
counsel could waive an accused's statutory speedy trial right without his consent for reasons o trial
preparation. State v. McBreen, 54 Ohio St. 2d 315, 376 N.E.2d 593 (1978).
87. 55 Ohio St. 2d at 152-53, 378 N.E.2d at 479.
88. State v. McBreen, 54 Ohio St. 2d 315,376 N.E.2d 593 (1978); State v. Wentworth, 54 Ohio
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the court has reiterated in cases decided after McRae that the burden is
wholly upon the state to bring an accused to trial within the statutory
period,8 9 the only rational explanation for McRae is that the court failed to
realize the implications of its holding, having confused the concepts of
waiver and section 2945.72(H) continuances. 90 McRae should be over-
ruled because it unfairly shifts the burden onto the accused to make sure
that he is brought to trial within the statutory period.
There is an additional reason for overruling McRae. In McRae there
was no journal entry stating that a continuance had been granted. There
was no indication in the record that at the time the trial date was set the
judge, prosecutor, or defense counsel knew that the statutory period would
be exceeded by the chosen date and that a continuance would be necessary
to toll the running of the time limit. Thus, the trial court in McRae did not
grant a continuance by journal entry prior to the expiration of the
statutory period. Instead, the trial court unknowingly set the original trial
date beyond the statutory period. On appeal, however, the Ohio Supreme
Court ruled that the action of the trial court constituted a continuance. The
court determined that it was not necessary that the setting of the trial date
beyond the statutory period take the actual form of a continuance, that is,
there did not need to be a formal journal entry granting a continuance.9'
The court avoided the need for a formal continuance by equating "the
original scheduling of the trial date" with "the granting of a continuance
other than upon the accused's own motion" pursuant to section
2945.72(H). It then determined that the reasonableness of this "con-
tinuance" was demonstrated on appeal by relying on facts in the record
that would have been grounds for granting a continuance had the trial
judge realized that the speedy trial period was about to expire.92 This
determination conflicts with prior cases concerning the granting of section
2945.72(H) continuances, in which the court had required without
exception that a formal journal entry listing the reasons for the
continuance be recorded prior to the expiration of the speedy trial time
period. 93
In State v. Silver,94 decided after McRae, the Ohio Supreme Court
St. 2d 171, 375 N.E.2d 424 (1978); State v. Tope, 53 Ohio St. 2d 250,374 N.E.2d 152 (1978); State v.
Singer, 50 Ohio St. 2d 103,362 N.E.2d 1216(1977); State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St. 2d 208, 357 N.E,2d 1095
(1976); State v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St. 2d 66,357 N.E.2d 40(1976); State v. Walker, 46 Ohlo St. 2d
157, 346 N.E.2d 687 (1976); State v. Pudlock, 44 Ohio St. 2d 104, 338 N.E.2d 524 (1975).
89. State v. Silver, 57 Ohio St. 2d 1, 384 N.E.2d 710 (1979); State v. Cutcher, 56 Ohio St. 2d 383,
384 N.E.2d 275 (1978); State v. Martin, 56 Ohio St. 2d 289, 384 N.E.2d 239 (1978).
90. The dissent in McRae did argue that the majority was improperly shifting the burden. State
v. McRae, 55 Ohio St. 2d 149, 154, 378 N.E.2d 476, 480 (1978) (Brown, 3., dissenting in part and
concurring in part). The forcefulness of the dissent's argument, however, was restricted by its failure to
distinguish between waiver and continuance.
91. Id. at 152-53, 378 N.E.2d at 479.
92. Id.
93. See generally notes 69-77 and accompanying text supra (discussing whether § 2945,72(H)
permits continuances for court congestion).
94. 57 Ohio St. 2d 1, 384 N.E.2d 710 (1979).
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refused to find that a continuance had been granted when "there [was] no
entry in the record ever setting a trial date within the time limits provided in
R.C. 2945.7195 or giving any reason for the date of defendant's trial
being substantially beyond such time limitations." 96 The court nevertheless
stated in Silver that the prosecution has the mandatory duty of complying
with the speedy trial statutes and thus has the burden of bringing an
accused to trial within the statutory period. The court has also previously
stated that "[i]t is evident that to construe R.C. 2945.71(H) too broadly
would render meaningless, and thwart the direction of, the speedy trial
statutes. 97
Anything less than a rule requiring a formal journal entry prior to the
expiration of the time period before there can be a section 2945.72(H)
continuance will thwart the direction of the speedy trial statutes, which
have as their purpose to make precise the time within which an accused
must be brought to trial. This time can never be precise if the reviewing
court can find, after the expiration of the prescribed period, that a
continuance had been granted without a formal entry. A formal entry
made prior to expiration is necessary to show first, that the trial court was
aware the speedy trial time was about to expire, second, that prior to the
expiration of the time period there existed proper reasons to extend the
period, and third, that the court extended the period expressly for these
proper reasons.
III. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO BRING AN ACCUSED TO TRIAL
OR PRELIMINARY HEARING WITHIN THE
PRESCRIBED PERIOD
A. When an Accused Is Not Brought to Trial Within
the Prescribed Period
Section 2945.73(B) provides that, upon a motion at or prior to the
commencement of trial, an accused will be discharged if he has not been
brought to trial within the statutorily prescribed period. Under section
2945.73(D), this discharge will be a bar to any further criminal proceedings
against the accused based on the same conduct.
The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the denial of a
motion to discharge pursuant to section 2945.73(B) is an interlocutory
order that is not appealable. 98 The court reasons that when an action is
95. The appellate court in Silver stated that a continuance could not be granted under §
2945.72(H) unless the trial court granted the continuance byjournal entry prior to the expiration of the
statutory time limit. Since this had not been done, it reversed the judgment of the trial court.The Ohio
Supreme Court decision does not construe § 2945.72(H) so strictly. It holds that either a judicial entry
prior to the expiration of the time limit, or the existence of a reason in the record for setting the trial
date beyond the statutory limit is adequate to support the finding that a § 2945.72(H) continuance had
been granted. The reason need not have been put into the record before the expiration of the timelimit.
It is enough that it was put into the record some time before appellate review.
96. 57 Ohio St. 2d at 4, 384 N.E.2d at 711 (emphasis added).
97. State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St. 2d 208, 209, 357 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (1976).
98. Bolus v. Engle, 48 Ohio St. 2d 3, 355 N.E.2d 493 (1976) (delay in preliminary hearing or trial
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pending and undetermined in a lower court, a superior court has no
authority to determine what the judgment should be in the lower court.
After a conviction in the trial court, however, defendant has a right of
appeal. 99 The trial court's action overruling the motion may then become
one of the assignments of error on appeal. Therefore, if accused wishes to
challenge the denial of his motion seeking a discharge for failure of the
state to bring him to trial within the statutorily prescribed period, he must
first stand trial. If he is convicted, he may appeal. The higher court will then
have jurisdiction to determine whether the accused's motion was valid and
whether the trial court erred in not discharging the accused. If the trial
court did err, the appellate court will discharge him. t00
B. When an Accused Is Not Accorded a Preliminary Hearing
Within the Prescribed Period
Section 2945.71(C)(1) provides that a person charged with a felony
must be accorded a preliminary hearing within fifteen days of his arrest.'
0
'
The computation rule of section 2945.71(D) is applicable and requires
that each day in jail be counted as three days. 10 2 Thus, an incarcerated per-
son should have his hearing within five actual day;. Section 2945.73(A)
not a ground for habeus corpus after accused has pleaded guilty or been convicted of crime charged,
since delay no longerexists); In re Singer, 45 Ohio St. 2d 130,341 N.E.2d 849 (1976) (habeus corpus not
proper remedy to test validity of denial of motion to discharge under § 2945.73(B)); State exreL Racine
v. Dull, 44 Ohio St. 2d 72, 337 N.E.2d 776 (1975) (mandamus seeking discharge not proper unless trial
court failed to rule on motion seeking discharge pursuant to § 2945.73(B)); State ex rel, Wentz v,
Correll, 41 Ohio St. 2d 101,322 N.E.2d 889 (1975) (mandamus compelling dismissal not proper when
trial court denied motion to discharge); State ex rel. Bell v. Blair, 43 Ohio St. 2d 95, 330 N,E,2d 902
(1975) (applicant whose motion for discharge was overruled not entitled to writ of prohibition
preventing further prosecution).
99. Ofso REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.67(A) (Page Supp. 1978) provides that the state can appeal a
decision of the trial court granting accused's motion to dismiss for failure to be brought to trial within
the statutory period, and § 2945.72(I) provides that the speedy trial time limit be extended during the
period of the appeal.
100. But see State v. Eberhardt, 56 Ohio App. 2d 193, 193-94, 381 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (1978), in
which the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals held:
As a general rule, neither an order overruling a motion to dismiss nor the entry of a nole
prosequi in a criminal case is a final appealable order. However, where the record
demonstrates that the state failed to afford an accused a timely trial and the accused was
therefore entitled to be discharged, but the trial court overruled a motion to dismiss and
subsequently allowed a nolleprosequi to be entered in the case, the order denying dismissal is
a final appealable order because it affected a substantial right and under the circumstances in
which it was rendered it in effect determined the action and prevented ajudgment within the
meaning of R.C. 2505.02.
101. In Ohio an accused does not have a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. The only
purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether sufficient facts exist to warrant the court to
bind the accused over to the grand jury and to set bail. Therefore, if an indictment is returned by the
grand jury prior to a preliminary hearing, there is no longer any need for a preliminary hearingsince it
probable cause determination has already been made. State v. Morris, 42 Ohio St. 2d 307,329 N.E,2d
85 (1975), cert. denied sub nom. McSpadden v. Ohio, 423 U.S.1049 (1976). The preliminary hearing
requirement in § 2945.71(C)(1) can, therefore, be read as a requirement that accused be provided a
preliminary hearing within 15 days of arrest if the prosecution elects to bring accused to a preliminary
hearing before going to the grand jury.
102. A continuance granted pursuant to § 2945.72(H) tolling the period within which the
preliminary hearing must be held also tolls the running of the period within which trial must be held,
State v. Martin, 56 Ohio St. 2d 289, 384 N.E.2d 239 (1978).
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requires that a felony charge be dismissed if an accused is not accorded a
preliminary hearing within this period and section 2945.73(D) states that
such a dismissal has the same effect as a nolle prosequi10 3
As a result of the recent Ohio Supreme Court decision in State v.
Pugh,10 4 the effectiveness of these provisions is seriously in doubt. In Pugh,
defendant was arrested and held in jail for eleven days before he posted
bond and was released. Eight days later he was provided a preliminary
hearing. At the hearing the defendant filed a motion to have the felony
charged dismissed pursuant to the appropriate speedy trial provisions. The
court overruled this motion and found probable cause to bind defendant
over to the grand jury. Forty-seven days later an indictment was filed in the
court of common pleas. At arraignment defendant pleaded not guilty. At
trial defendant again moved to dismiss for failure to be accorded a
preliminary hearing within the prescribed period. The court overruled the
motion and defendant was subsequently convicted. On appeal, the court of
appeals held that although the charge against defendant should have been
dismissed by the municipal court at the preliminary hearing, the
subsequent indictment "cured" the failure of the state to provide defendant
a preliminary hearing within the prescribed period.
By a four to three majority, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals. Three concurring opinions and one
dissenting opinion were filed. Justice Paul Brown, concurring, alone
agreed with the court of appeals that the subsequent indictment "cured"
the failure to provide defendant with a timely preliminary hearing. 10 5 The
remaining six justices stated that the statutory mandate to provide a
preliminary hearing within the prescribed period could not be "cured" by
an indictment filed outside that period.
Justice Herbert, concurring in the judgment, stated that while the
statute mandated that defendant be discharged under the circumstances,
the legislature had exceeded its authority in enacting the speedy trial
statutes.10 6 He felt that whether a particular defendant had been provided a
speedy trial was a factual question and thus a matter that should be
entrusted to the judiciary.10 7 On the facts in Pugh, Justice Herbert thought
103. Under Ohio law, if a nolle prosequi is entered before ajury is sworn, an accused has not been
placed injeopardy and another prosecution for the same offense is permissible. Onto REv. Co EA.N,%:.
§ 2941.33 (Page 1975); State v. Sanders, 365 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1973), affid, 500 F.2d 1403 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
104. 53 Ohio St. 2d 153, 372 N.E.2d 1351 (1978).
105. Id. at 159-60, 372 N.E.2d at 1354 (P. Brown, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 156, 372 N.E.2d at 1352 (Herbert, J., concurring).
107. Justice Herbert argued that the legislature had violated the doctrine ofseparation ofpowers
by enacting the speedy trial statutes. He cited United States v. Howsard, 440 F. Supp. 1106 (D.C. Md.
1977), in support of his view. In Howard, a federal district courtjudge held the Federal Speedy Trial
Act of 1974 unconstitutional. Although he had already determined thatdefendants were not entitled to
discharge under that Act, Judge Young stated that "[r]egardless of the proper construction of the
Speedy Trial Act, its commands cannot be given effect because they are an unconstitutional legislative
encroachment on the judiciary." Id. at 1109. Judge Platt observed that the federal Speedy Trial Act of
1974 might be saved from unconstitutionality by permitting defendants to waive the statutory time
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defendant had been provided a speedy trial and thus he agreed that the
court of appeals was correct in refusing to release him. 0 8
Justice Celebrezze, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Locher,
reasoned that defendant's entering of a plea to the indictment constituted a
waiver of compliance with the preliminary hearing time limitation. 0 9 This
view was specifically rejected by Justice Herbert and the three dissenting
justices. The dissenting opinion of Justice William Brown, in which Justice
Sweeney and Chief Justice O'Neill concurred, asserted that the language of
section 2945.73(A) made dismissal mandatory and that the failure to
dismiss thus invalidated the subsequent conviction.
10
Had defendant refused to plead, a majority of the court, consisting of
Justices Celebrezze, Locher, William Brown, Sweeney, and O'Neill,
agreed he would have been entitled to discharge; a different majority, con-
sisting of Justices Herbert, William Brown, Sweeney, and O'Neill, believed
that the defendant's entering a plea to the indictment did not waive his
right to have the charges against him dismissed. Since no single interpre-
tation appears to have majority support, it is difficult to discern the present
status of an accused's statutory right to a speedy preliminary hearing. Iron-
ically, the dissenting opinion is most consistent with other decisions of the
court holding that the statutes are mandatory and should be strictly con-
strued.1
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ohio legislature enacted the speedy trial statutes in 1974 as an
attempt to specify and define an imprecise constitutional right. The
limits. Platt, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: A Critical Commentary, 44 BROOKLYN L. Ruv. 757 (1978).
The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a defendant can waive his statutory right to H speedy
trial. Westlake v. Cougill, 56 Ohio St. 2d 230,383 N.E.2d 599 (1978); State v. McRae, 55 Ohio St. 2d
149, 378 N.E.2d 476 (1978); State v. McBreen, 54 Ohio St. 2d 315, 376 N.E.2d 593 (1978). Thus, the
Ohio statutes satisfy the standard proposed by Judge Platt.
108. In Pugh, 41 statutory days (the I1 days defendant spent in jail equals 33 statutory days,
added to these are the eight days defendant was out on bond, for a total of 41 statutory days) had
elapsed before a determination was made concerning whether sufficient facts existed to warrant
holding defendant under arrest until he was bound over to the grand jury. Justice Herbert argued that
defendant was not prejudiced by this delay and therefore was denied no right protected by the speedy
trial guarantee. Yet the United States Supreme Court had stated that the right to a speedy trial is in part
to prevent undue incarceration and to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation.
See note 3 and accompanying text supra. Certainly the legislature is legtimately attempting to protect
an accused from undue incarceration and anxiety when it require:s that he be given a prompt
preliminary hearing. Furthermore, there appeared to have been no explanation or justification for
having required defendant in Pugh to wait almost three times the prescribed period before he was given
a preliminary hearing.
In his concurring opinion in State v. Wentworth, 54 Ohio St. 2d 171, 375 N.E.2d 424 (1978)
(Herbert, J., concurring), Justice Herbert asserted that it was not necessary to rely on speedy trial
statutes to protect an accused's constitutional right. In State v. Tope, 53 Ohio St. 2d 250,374 N.E,2d
152 (1978), in which defendant was discharged because he was not brought to trial until three days
beyond the statutory time limit, Justice Herbert dissented, citing his opinion in Piugh. Id. at 253,374
N.E.2d at 154.
109. 53 Ohio St. 2d at 156, 372 N.E.2d at 1353 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 160, 372 N.E.2d at 1355 (W. Brown, J., dissenting).
11. See notes 88-89 supra.
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legislature set specified time limits within which an accused had to be
brought to trial and enumerated exceptions that would temporarily extend
those limits. Realizing that all contingencies could not be covered, the
legislature left the statutes'12 sufficiently general to allow the courts a
limited amount of discretion to give temporary continuances.
Decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court interpreting the continuance
provisionhave severely compromised the statute's effectiveness. By finding
a continuance if the trial court has "reasonably" set the trial date beyond
the statutorily prescribed period," 3 the court is in effect repealing the
specified time limits and retreating to the imprecise constitutional
standard.
The Ohio Supreme Court has been reluctant to follow the seemingly
clear statutory language that mandates discharge of an accused when the
state has failed to bring him to trial promptly. Instead, the court looks to
whether the legislative purpose behind the enactment of the speedy trial
statutes is furthered by such a discharge."14 In the court's view, the
legislative purpose that underlies the statutes is to correct the judicial
process when it has been at fault in not bringing the accused to trial within
the prescribed time limits." 5 This interpretation misconstrues the purpose
behind the statutes: to ensure to every accused his right to a speedy trial. It
may be necessary for the legislature to clarify its purposes by limiting the
statutory flexibility that the courts have used to dilute the protections
afforded by the speedy trial statutes.
Gary N. Sales
112. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.72(H) (Page Supp. 1978), quotedat note 11 supra; notes
65-68 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 91-95 and accompanying text supra.
114. State v. Ladd, 56 Ohio St. 2d 197, 201, 383 N.E.2d 579, 582 (1978).
115. ld. at 200, 383 N.E.2d at 581.
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